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This article analyses the first Bush administration’s policy toward the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), finding that as with Soviet-American
relations and US policy toward Eastern Europe, the administration diverged from
the foreign policy of its predecessor. Whereas previously the CSCE had been a forum
to encourage progress on human rights, promote reform in Eastern Europe, and
encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union, under Bush it became a tool to
manage the transformation of Europe and preserve the Atlantic alliance. This new
approach was guided by uncertainty about the CSCE’s usefulness as a multilateral
forum, scepticism about Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, and a preference for stability.
Introduction
Despite his early hesitations about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), Ronald Reagan and his administration were actively involved in the
multilateral negotiations and saw the process as useful to advancing their foreign
policy objectives.1 Given George H. W. Bush’s eight years as Reagan’s vice president,
observers might have expected a high degree of continuity in their foreign policies,
including on the CSCE. Yet United States CSCE policy was intimately connected with
American policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; therefore when the
new Bush team decided it needed to reevaluate United States policy toward those
countries, its stance on the CSCE was subject to revision as well. In the end the Bush
administration employed the CSCE very differently than Reagan and his advisors had
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1 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a multilateral conference structure made
up of 35 North American and European countries that facilitated confidence building measures, human
contacts, and other types of interaction despite the East-West division of Europe.
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done. Whereas the Reagan administration eventually used the CSCE as a forum to
encourage progress on human rights, promote reform in Eastern Europe, and
encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union, Bush’s aides came to see it as a tool to
manage the transformation of Europe and preserve the Atlantic alliance, making CSCE
policy a further example of discontinuity between the two administrations.2
The scepticism that the Bush administration maintained toward the CSCE was
likely due to several factors. First, Bush and his foreign policy team questioned the
utility of the CSCE as a multilateral forum as well as some specific commitments made
by the previous administration. Second, and perhaps more important, the
administration’s hesitation about the CSCE fit into a broader picture of distrust of
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s programme of reform and Bush’s efforts to develop
a new approach toward Eastern Europe. Third, the administration prioritised stability
over transformation and did not demonstrate a strong commitment to human rights.
Given the intersection of these issues, exploring US CSCE policy in these years
illuminates some of the principal tenets of Bush’s foreign policy.3
As early as his January 1989 confirmation hearings, Secretary of State designee James
Baker, who had served in the previous administration as chief of staff and treasury
secretary, indicated ‘some reservations’ about the United States’s acquiescence to
holding a CSCE conference on the human dimension in Moscow, arguing more
progress was needed by the Soviet Union. His pronouncement was a signal that the
Bush administration would diverge from Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz’s
engagement with the Soviets through the Helsinki process.4 The Moscow Conference
on the Human Dimension, scheduled to be held in 1991 and address human contacts,
information, culture, and other issues, was agreed to at the closing session of the
Vienna CSCE review meeting. After several years of negotiations, agreement was
reached just before the end of Reagan’s term, which had been a key objective for
Shultz.5 The push to complete the talks before Reagan left office indicated an awareness
that a new administration could lead to undesirable delays as well as concerns about
how Bush might approach the CSCE. Considerable reform on radio jamming, political
prisoners, and exit visas had been a condition to United States agreement. State
Department officials such as Shultz took great pride in their role in encouraging such
progress; Baker’s comment therefore foretold a new foreign policy philosophy.
2 For more on Reagan’s CSCE policy, see Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold
War: ATransnational History of theHelsinki Network (NewYork: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011), 135–216.
3 Bush’s CSCE policy has not yet received sustained attention in the scholarship on the period.
4 Don Oberdorfer, ‘Baker Wary of Soviet Rights Meeting’,Washington Post 19 January 1989, A7. Michael
Beschloss and Strobe Talbott suggest there was early evidence of divergence on Soviet-American relations,
arguing that when Reagan visited Gorbachev, Bush declared, ‘The Cold War isn’t over’ and reportedly
questioned Reagan’s ‘sentimentality’ for Gorbachev. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest
Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 9. The term
Helsinki process refers to the initial Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (1972–75) and all of
the related, international meetings that followed.
5 Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 212.
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Perhaps this new approach to the CSCE was due to the considerable improvements
in Soviet human rights practices in the final years of Reagan’s term. As Baker noted
during one of his visits to Moscow:
I would say that we both agreed that progress on the human rights leg of our agenda
has been quite good over the past two or three years. The list of refuseniks has
dwindled considerably. The Soviet Union is permitting much freer emigration. They
are even legislating that into their laws. So, we do have a changed situation. We will
always have human rights on our agenda, but there’s a different situation than there
was three to four and five years ago.6
More likely it reflected different priorities. The Bush administration was less concerned
with reforming the human rights practices of communist regimes than its predecessor
had been. In Bush’s 1980 campaign for president, he outlined a realist approach to
human rights violations: ‘We should consider our strategic interests in the world as well
as the human rights question.’7 Similarly, Bush’s diary entries do not suggest human
rights were of great concern to him.8 Bush’s published writings contrast with those of
Reagan in that he does not seem to have been moved in the same way by the plight of
individuals in Eastern Europe suffering from human rights violations.9 Furthermore, his
chief foreign policy aide Brent Scowcroft had been sceptical of emphasising human rights
as a priority in United States foreign policy since the 1976 election.10
Bush’s ‘strategic pause’
Differences between the Reagan administration’s approach toward the CSCE and
human rights as opposed to Bush’s were connected to a broader project of
distinguishing Bush’s foreign policy from that of Reagan. According to Baker, Bush
‘personally was quite conscious of the need to put his own imprint on policy.’11 In the
words of other observers, the Bush administration wanted to pursue a foreign policy
that was more than ‘Reagan-plus’.12 As part of Bush’s effort to develop his own foreign
6 Press Release, 9 February 1990, Folder 20, Box 161, James A. Baker III Papers, Seeley G. Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. (Hereafter James A. Baker III Papers.)
7 Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997), 212.
8 George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1999), 416. See also Andrew Preston, ‘The Politics of Realism and Religion: Christian Responses
to Bush’s New World Order’, Diplomatic History 34:1 (January 2010): 104.
9 Bush’s most emotional response to human rights violations came in relation to the Cambodian
genocide. Jeffrey A. Engel, ed. The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 81, 251, 282.
10 David F. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 57, 63.
11 James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P.
Putman’s Sons, 1995), 68.
12 Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy? The Pause of 1989’, in William
C. Wohlforth, ed. Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2003), 149.
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policy, he initiated a reevaluation of American policy toward the Soviet Union.13
According to Baker, Bush wanted to assure himself that ‘Gorbachev was for real’.14
In Bush’s view, the reassessment of American policy toward the Soviet Union was
intended ‘so we can move out in front of Gorbachev’.15 While the review was
underway, Soviet-American relations were largely placed on hold, in what became
known as a ‘pause’.
Bush’s strategic pause was about more than proving he was his own man and
escaping Reagan’s foreign policy shadow. It also reflected that Bush retained almost
none of Reagan’s foreign policy advisors; Colin Powell was one exception. Instead he
turned to James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Dick Cheney as his chief foreign policy
aides; all brought attitudes about negotiations with the Soviets formed in the 1970s,
not the Reagan years. Cheney and Scowcroft first gained considerable foreign policy
experience in Gerald Ford’s White House with Scowcroft serving as Ford’s National
Security Advisor and Cheney as Chief of Staff. The frustration of pursuing de´tente
with the Soviet Union and Reagan’s sharp criticism of the policy in the 1976 election
campaign had left Scowcroft and Cheney hesitant to cooperate with Soviet leaders.16
This led Scowcroft to be, in his own words, ‘very hard-nosed about Gorbachev’.17
Scowcroft signalled his distrust when shortly after Bush’s inauguration he asserted ‘the
Cold War is not over.’ Furthermore, he expressed some caution about the
consequences of such an end: ‘There may be, in the saying, light at the end of the
tunnel. But I think it depends partly on how we behave, whether the light is the sun or
an incoming locomotive.’18 According to diplomatic historian David Schmitz,
Scowcroft’s approach to United States foreign policy was also shaped by what he saw as
the failure of WoodrowWilson’s efforts to ‘transform Europe’.19 Such an interpretation
of Versailles helps to explain the Bush administration’s resistance to reshaping Europe
fundamentally after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although Baker played a less influential
13 National Security Review – 3, 15 February 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php
(accessed 2 June 2011).
14 Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (College
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008), 15.
15 Bush, All the Best, 418.
16 For further discussion, see Chollet and Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy?’ 143; Sarah B. Snyder,
‘Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President,’ Diplomacy and
Statecraft 21:1 (March 2010): 87–106; Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 54; and Leo P. Ribuffo, ‘Is Poland a Soviet
Satellite?: Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 1976’, Diplomatic History 14
(Summer 1990): 385–403. Donald Rumsfeld’s memoirs are also particularly revealing on this point. For
example, discussing the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations, Rumsfeld wrote:
‘I was concerned that the Soviet Union had not proved to be true to its word in previous negotiations. The
Soviets were not forthcoming about the level of their defense expenditures. They also appeared to have
been violating at least the spirit of the first SALT by concealing missile silos and other military
infrastructure.’ Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 229.
17 See Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 95
18 David Hoffman, ‘Gorbachev Seen as Trying to Buy Time for Reform’, Washington Post January 23,
1989, A9.
19 Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 11.
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role in Ford’s administration, he had run Ford’s reelection campaign and thus likely
internalised some of the same messages as Cheney and Scowcroft on the toxicity of the
pursuit of de´tente to Ford’s reelection hopes. Bush’s aides suspected that Gorbachev’s
reforms were intended to strengthen the Soviet Union at American expense. Their
review marked an attempt to avoid seduction by Gorbachev and coolly reevaluate
Soviet-American relations. Any evaluation of the administration’s approach to the
CSCE must be located within an assessment of how the ‘strategic pause’ shaped its
policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Bush outlined his new strategy for incorporating the Soviet Union into the broader
European and international community and encouraging further democratisation,
economic reform, and changes in Soviet foreign policy at a 12 May 1989
commencement speech at Texas A & M University.20 The administration, however,
maintained a competitive approach to the Soviet Union. Within the Bush White
House, many including Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater were frustrated by what they
viewed as a media infatuation with Gorbachev at the expense of Bush and his
initiatives. In order to change the narrative and highlight the presumed emptiness of
Gorbachev’s rhetoric, Fitzwater characterised Gorbachev as engaging in a public
relations strategy in a ‘drugstore cowboy fashion’, intended to highlight that the Soviet
leader was making ‘promises he can’t keep’.21 Over the course of 1989, American
suspicions subsided as steps by Gorbachev demonstrated that his reforms were more
than rhetorical, particularly when he did not intervene in Eastern Europe. For Baker,
the Soviet response to the fall of the Berlin Wall demonstrated the United States could
work with Gorbachev:
They told us early on they weren’t going to use force to keep the empire together.
And when they didn’t that proved that they were telling us the truth and that they
could be trusted and that we could do business with them.22
In addition, as Bush’s term progressed, Soviet and American leaders met and
developed personal relationships.
Despite the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union itself remained, in
1989, a heavily armed communist state with which the United States hoped to reduce
20 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, AWorld Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 53–4. In
addition, the Bush White House began to think about what a Soviet Union would look like without
Gorbachev as its leader. To that end, in an address at the Coast Guard Academy shortly thereafter, Bush
again emphasised the need for institutionalisation of reform in the Soviet Union. Parmet, George Bush,
386, 388–9; and Maynard, Out of the Shadow, x. 39. Many observers, however, were frustrated by the slow
pace of the pause and the lack of political innovation it produced.
21Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!: Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen: A Decade with Presidents and the
Press (New York: Random House, 1995), 230–3.
22Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 41. Similarly, the event offered Bush the opportunity to reassure the
Soviet Politburo that he would not capitalise on instability in the Soviet sphere of influence. William Forest
Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush’s Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification’, in
Martin J. Medhurst, ed. The Rhetorical Presidency of George H. W. Bush (College Station: Texas A & M
University Press, 2006), 43.
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tension. After he had been in office for several months, Bush wrote to Gorbachev to
propose they meet in person: ‘I just want to reduce the chances there could be
misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal
basis.’23 The resulting December 1989 meeting in Malta was the first between the two
leaders since Bush took office. In the months leading up to the summit, the Bush
administration tried to signal a new stage of Soviet-American relations, one
characterised by cooperation and proclaimed to represent a ‘New World Order’.
Scowcroft later admitted that the Bush administration ‘cooked up’ the new world order
as a framework for presenting the new Soviet-American relationship, and soon after
announcing it the White House began disassociating itself from the concept.24
Demonstrating its continued scepticism about Gorbachev’s reforms and concerns
that he was getting undue international attention for his proposals, the Bush
administration put together a ‘basket of initiatives’ to ensure that Gorbachev could not
seize the advantage from Bush at the meeting.25 At Malta, the Bush White House did
not intend to shy away from uncomfortable topics such as human rights and regional
contacts altogether. Bush planned to press Gorbachev to institutionalise the progress
his government was making on human rights and to act on outstanding divided family
and refusenik cases.26 Bush also encouraged further improvement, urging Gorbachev
to address emigration so that Bush could waive Jackson-Vanik. To that end, Bush gave
Gorbachev a list of cases of interest to the United States, noting he hoped that by the
subsequent year the United States would have no more lists. Gorbachev reportedly
said, ‘Let us know how many immigrants you want, and we’ll send them to you!’27
At the summit, Bush tried to assure the Soviet leader of his favourable intentions.
Meeting with Gorbachev on the U.S.S. Belknap, the president said:
I hope you’ve noticed that as change has accelerated in Eastern Europe recently, we
haven’t responded with flamboyance or arrogance so as to make your situation more
difficult. They say, ‘Bush is too timid, too cautious.’ I am cautious, but not timid.
I’ve tried to conduct myself in a way so as not to complicate your difficulties.28
Bush’s stance was driven by concern about provoking a conservative backlash or
crackdown in the Soviet Union, either of which could jeopardise reform there and in
Eastern Europe.
23 Bush, All the Best, 433.
24 Bartholomew H. Sparrow, ‘Resumption of History: The Rise and Fall of the NewWorld Order’, (paper
presented at the Society of the History of American Foreign Relations annual meeting, June 2011).
25 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 144.
26 Theme Paper: US-Soviet Priorities in 1990, 20 November 1989, 2008-1240-MR, Bush Library.
27 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 158; JAB Notes from 12/2-3/89 MaltaMeetings, Folder 12,
Box 108, Baker Papers; Bush and Scowcroft, AWorld Transformed, 162–3; White House Fact Sheet on the
Meeting With Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta, 4 December 1989, bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
research/papers/1989/89120400.html (accessed 22 May 2006); and Press Themes: Washington Summit, 22
May 1990, www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/1539.pdf (accessed 6 June 2011).
28 Parmet, George Bush, 410–1; and Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 261.
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At Malta, American and Soviet leaders saw evidence of a new relationship. Despite
the stormy seas, Bush regarded Malta as ‘enormously successful.’29 Bush reported to
the press that:
the climate of the meetings was without rancor and without hostility. I remember a
time when I first met Mr. Gorbachev and we talked about human rights, and he
became visibly agitated with me for raising it. And I think there’s been a great
evolution in his thinking on that question, and certainly on his relations with the
United States, just as there had been an evolution on my thinking.30
Scowcroft regards the Malta meeting as an important turning point in Bush and
Gorbachev’s personal interaction. Although the initial meeting did not resolve all
issues between the two countries, it did enable the Bush administration to forge its
own, productive relationship with the Soviet leadership.31 Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze viewed the meeting so favourably, he declared it where ‘the cold
war quietly came to an end.’32
A Europe whole and free
Scowcroft argued that changes in the Soviet Union not only necessitated a
reassessment of Soviet-American relations but also a broadening of United States
policy from focusing primarily on the Soviet Union to paying greater attention to
Eastern Europe. As part of that move, he wanted to change how the United States
differentiated among Eastern European states. Up until this point, American foreign
policy had long rewarded states such as Romania that exhibited some independence
from the USSR in international relations; Scowcroft argued a more appropriate policy
would be to favour states energetically pursuing political and economic reform.33
A memorandum outlining the national security review to be undertaken regarding
Eastern Europe argued: ‘We often speak of Eastern Europe as a whole but, of course,
we must treat the countries individually. The policies that we design must take
discriminating account of the pace and direction of reform in each of these nations.’34
Initially, Bush articulated American hopes for Eastern Europe and encouraged
reform through speeches in Hamtramck, Michigan andMainz, Germany. Bush and his
aides saw the progress in Poland as validation of long-time United States policy; notes
29 Bush, All the Best, 448. Fitzwater disagrees with press characterisations of Bush lacking ‘vision,’
arguing his conduct of the Malta summit demonstrated otherwise. Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 245–6, 255.
30 Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Malta, 3 December 1989, bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
research/papers/1989/89120304.html (accessed 26 March 2006).
31Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 51; Chollet and Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy?’ 158; and Notes,
Malta Summit, 2–3 December 1989, in Munteanu, ed. ‘The End of the Cold War.’
32 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom trans. Catherine Fitzpatrick (London: Sinclair-
Stevenson, 1991), 98.
33 Bush and Scowcroft, AWorld Transformed, 38.
34 National Security Review – 4, 15 February 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php
(accessed 2 June 2011).
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by a Bush aide in connection with the Hamtramck speech indicate the administration’s
conviction that changes in Eastern Europe demonstrated that, ‘Containment has
worked.’35 Several weeks later, Bush travelled to Germany where he suggested what was
at stake in the changes taking place in Eastern Europe: ‘The Cold War began with the
division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole.’ More explicitly, he
challenged the continuing division of Europe using Gorbachev’s own rhetoric: ‘There
cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move from room to
room.’36
As a means of implementing the administration’s differentiation policy, Bush
travelled to Hungary and Poland in July 1989. Hungary and Poland had made the
greatest progress to date in terms of political pluralism, reducing restrictions on travel,
and bridging the East-West divide. In planning his trip to Hungary and Poland, Bush
consciously exercised restraint: ‘The visit, however, was intended primarily to
encourage reformers there, yet I had to be cautious about what I said and did . . . If
massive crowds gathered, intent on showing their opposition to Soviet dominance,
things could get out of control.’37 To highlight, and in some respects reward, the
liberalisation of Polish politics, Bush met with General Jaruzelski and members of
Solidarity, including Lech Wałe˛sa.38 In retrospect, Bush reported: ‘We had
unmistakably demonstrated our support for the process of reform, had done it in a
way which gave heart to the Poles without things getting out of hand, and had avoided
provoking a backlash.’39 Polish-American relations expert Gregory Domber, however,
notes that Bush’s 1989 visit was far more sombre than the high energy trip he made as
vice president in 1987 when he had an ‘exuberant’ session with Wałe˛sa and the two
made a surprise appearance together.40
In Hungary, a demonstration of the change underway in the country came when Prime
Minister Miklo´s Ne´meth gave Bush a piece of the barbed wire that had until recently
separatedHungary fromAustria. InBudapest, Bush recognised thepotential role theCSCE
could play in facilitating change in Europe: ‘The hopeful process ofHelsinki points theway
to the enhancement of freedom in Central Europe – to a new basis for security and
cooperation in all of Europe.’41 Despite the significant changes, Bush remained cautious in
his characterisation of Eastern Europe and was unwilling to declare the Cold War over:
35 Backgrounder for Press Briefing, President’s Trip Files to Poland/Hungary 7/89 [1 of 2], OA/ED:
CF00716, Subject Files, Condoleezza Rice – 1989–1990, NSC, Bush Library.
36 Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, American Presidency
Project. For more on Gorbachev’s use of the term ‘common European home’, see Marie-Pierre Rey,
‘‘Europe is our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept’, Cold War History 4:2
(January 2004): 33–65.
37 Bush and Scowcroft, AWorld Transformed, 115.
38 Gregory F. Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability: Reevaluating US Policy during Poland’s Democratic
Transformation in 1989’, Journal of Cold War Studies 13:3 (Summer 2011): 70–1.
39 Bush and Scowcroft, AWorld Transformed, 123.
40 Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 73.
41 Press Release, 11 July 1989, President Bush’s Trip to Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands 7/9-18/89
[1 of 2] OA/ID: CF 00868, Roman Papadiuk Files, Bush Library; and Parmet, George Bush, 406.
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I don’t like to use ‘cold war’ . . .. That has a connotation of worse days in terms of
East-West relationship. I think things have moved forward so that the
connotation that those two words conjure up is entirely different now. And yet
I don’t want to stand here and seem euphoric—that everything is hunky-dory
between the East and the West on arms or on differences in the economy or no
how we look at regional problems. We have some big differences, still. But let’s
encourage the change. And then I can answer your question in maybe a few more
years more definitively.42
The challenge faced by the Bush administration was to encourage reform in Eastern
Europe without inducing a backlash and provoking reform-oriented leaders to reverse
course. Although Bush shared Scowcroft’s interest in Eastern European liberalisation,
he wanted to avoid instigating a crackdown like the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968.43 An even greater priority than preventing internal repression,
however, was a conscious effort not to inhibit reform by embarrassing the Soviets.44
Just as Reagan’s adoption of a policy of quiet diplomacy after the 1985 Geneva summit
may have enabled progress on Soviet human rights violations, Bush’s cautious
approach may have given Gorbachev more latitude in his reform, suggesting some
continuity between the two administrations and facilitating the eventual relinquish-
ment of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.45 After his visits had ended, Bush
reiterated that his goals in Poland and Hungary were not to ‘poke a stick in the eye of
Mr. Gorbachev’ but rather to encourage further Soviet reforms.46 Bush’s continued
focus on Gorbachev and the Soviet Union despite his travels supports Domber’s
contention about the administration’s ‘scepticism’ about the prospects for successful
Eastern European revolutions.47
Only several months later, East Germans breached the Berlin Wall. Freedom of
passage between East and West Germany inspired widespread celebrations, although
not, notably, at the White House. The administration’s response at the time suggested
it was out of touch with the enormity of the events unfolding. Before the infamous
press conference in which Bush displayed little enthusiasm for the fall of the wall, Bush
told his press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, ‘I’m not going to dance on the Berlin Wall.
42 Parmet, George Bush, 406.
43 Beyond not wanting to accelerate the course of reform, Domber has argued the Bush administration
took ‘steps to slow the pace of change when the democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary were
nearing a crescendo.’ Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 54.
44 This priority fit with Scowcroft’s interpretation of the dangers of humiliating a defeated enemy, such
as happened in the aftermath of World War One. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 120.
45 Sterling Kernek, ‘Realism in the Post-Cold War Era’ in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. The Reagan
Presidency: Ten Intimate Perspectives of Ronald Reagan (MD: University Press of America, 1997). Gorbachev
appreciated that the United States refrained from exploiting Soviet problems for its own gain. For more on
Reagan’s quiet diplomacy, see Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 164–6.
46 Press Release, 13 July 1989, President’s Trip to Poland, Hungary, Paris Economic Summit and the
Netherlands (7/89) [1 of 4], OA/ID: CF 00867, Roman Papadiuk Files, Bush Library.
47 Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 54, 78.
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The last thing I want to do is brag about winning the cold war, or bringing the wall
down. It won’t help us in Eastern Europe to be bragging about this.’48
Bush did ensure that no one could accuse him of bragging about the fall of the wall.
Indeed, SenateMajority Leader GeorgeMitchell (D-ME) charged Bushwith ‘timidity’ in
his foreign policy toward Europe.49 CBS reporter Lesley Stahl said: ‘People are celebrating
the end of the cold war, and President Bush acts like he’s asleep.’50 To external observers,
Bush reacted too cautiously in his immediate response and when he finally spoke about
the development at greater length in his ThanksgivingDay address. Rather than using the
speech to respond in a concrete way to the facts on the ground in Berlin, one observer has
written that Bushmade only ‘a generic celebration of democratic values’.51 Bush’s limited
response reflected both his cautious nature and his lack of vision for a post-Cold War
order. Themotivations for new approaches toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
as well as the conservative nature of those policies are essential context to understanding
how Bush’s administration conceived of and operated in the CSCE.
No pause for the CSCE
Although the Bush administration instituted a strategic pause in its relations with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in a bilateral context, in the multilateral CSCE such a
step was not possible. The schedule of CSCE meetings had been largely set before Bush
entered office and to have suggested revision could have created an international
diplomatic incident. In Bush’s first year, therefore, the United States participated in
CSCE negotiations but demonstrated a lack of engagement.52
The Paris Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD) opened in late May 1989
amid accelerating reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The changes in Eastern
Europe fostered improvements in East-West relations and facilitated positive steps at
Paris. In particular, changes in Soviet policy led to less intransigence on Helsinki
issues, enabling the CSCE to become a more productive forum.53 In his Mainz speech
several days after the meeting began, Bush recognised an opportunity for the CSCE to
facilitate change in Eastern Europe:
48 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 262; Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 42; Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came
Tumbling Down’, 43; and Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, ‘‘His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the
Diplomacy of German Unification’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 13:4 (December 2002): 125–7. Scowcroft
supported this approach. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 119–20.
49 Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down’, 38.
50 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 264.
51 Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down’, 47.
52 The Bush administration’s uncertainly about the utility of the CSCE stands in contrast to Schmitz’s
characterisation of Scowcroft was the ‘biggest advocate’ in the Ford administration for American
attendance at the CSCE summit in Helsinki. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 46.
53 United States representatives also met informally with Soviet officials at several points during the Paris
meeting to try to resolve individual cases. William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the
Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 283–5.
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I propose we strengthen and broaden the Helsinki process to promote free elections
and political pluralism in Eastern Europe . . .The foundation for lasting security
comes not from tanks, troops, or barbed wire; it is built on shared values and
agreements that link free peoples.54
The administration, however, sent conflicting signals on the CSCE. Baker did not
attend the opening session of the Paris Conference on the Human Dimension, which
was seen as evidence of the Bush administration’s distance from the CSCE. American
officials active on the CSCE, such as members of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, had urged Baker’s participation.55 Yet, as a State Department
official explained, ‘ . . .we and several of our allies believe that CSCE implementation
reviews should be held at the experts level only . . .ministerial level attendance in Paris
could create an unhelpful precedent for attendance at the Moscow Conference in
1991.’56 As at many earlier CSCE meetings, there was a range of proposals seeking to
advance respect for human rights. For example, Western proposals sought to ensure
religious freedom, minority rights, freedom of movement, the rule of law, trade union
rights, and freedoms of assembly, association, and expression.57 During the meeting
other Eastern European states also demonstrated new approaches to human rights and
the CSCE. For example, Hungary shifted away from the traditional Warsaw Pact
position on exit visas, submitting a proposal with the United States and Austria
pressing for their liberalisation.58 United States delegate Representative Steny Hoyer
(D-MD) even introduced a proposal on free, multi-party elections.59 Although
considerable reforms had been implemented in Eastern Europe, Hoyer’s proposal was
at the least overly optimistic. The interagency dialogue surrounding Hoyer’s proposal
is currently unavailable, making it unclear how the aggressive outline for political
reform fit within Bush’s dual priorities of encouraging reformwhile exercising caution.
Although regarded as a productive session, Paris ended without a concluding
document due in part to the short period since the end of the Vienna meeting.60
54 Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, American Presidency
Project.
55 Ibid., 280; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki: Report
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57 CSCE/CDHP.1, 14 June 1989, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Archives, Prague,
Czech Republic; CSCE/CDHP.2, 14 June 1989, ibid; CSCE/CDHP.6, 16 June 1989, ibid; CSCE/CDHP.8, 16
June 1989, ibid; CSCE/CDHP.29, 19 June 1989, ibid. (Hereafter OSCE Archives.)
58 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, ‘Paris Human Dimension Meeting:
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59 CSCE/CDHP.33, 20 June 1989, OSCE Archives.
60 Although had the delegations desired a concluding document, Romania would have been an
impediment. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Conference on Security and
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‘A new age of Europe’
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe in the year between the CHD meetings in
Paris and Copenhagen meant that many traditional Helsinki points of controversy
between East and West were no longer contentious. In a further sign of the
fundamental changes within some CSCE states, the Conference on Economic
Cooperation in Europe held in Bonn from 19March to 11 April 1990 outlined support
for market economics.61 Meetings such as Bonn and Copenhagen charted the way for
Eastern Europe to adopt democratic pluralism and market economics. Bush told
graduates at the University of South Carolina that the United States intended to ‘work
to broaden the mandate of the CSCE’. He announced his approach to the upcoming
Copenhagen CHD, saying:
Less than a month from now, as one of the 35 nations of the CSCE, the United States
will take part in a conference on human rights, including free elections, political
pluralism, and the rule of law. And I’ve instructed Ambassador Max Kampelman,
head of our delegation, to seek a new consensus on these cornerstones of freedoms,
rights, and democracy. As I said last week at Oklahoma State University, we must
work within the CSCE to bring Eastern Europe’s new democracies into this
commonwealth of free nations.62
The proposals Bush enumerated were intended to institutionalise political reform
in Eastern Europe to ensure that the recent liberalisation would become
permanent. Importantly, however, Bush did not conceive of making the CSCE
into a formal institution that some readings of the term ‘commonwealth’ might
have implied.
CSCE delegates to Copenhagen repeatedly remarked on the fundamental changes in
Eastern Europe, with the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs heralding the changes in
Eastern Europe as ‘nothing less than a transformation of our Continent’. He went on
to attribute considerable responsibility to the CSCE for these changes, saying ‘The
CSCE is at the core of these developments . . . it was also a blueprint for action . . . .
when Europe now speaks of human rights, it increasingly does so in one language.’63
Secretary of State James Baker echoed his sentiments, saying: ‘My friends, we are
present at the creation of a new age of Europe’, and discussed how dissidence in
Footnote 60 continued
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61 Document of the Bonn Conference, http://www.osce.org/eea/14081 (accessed 11 November 2012).
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CSCE Files, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Open Society Archives.
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Eastern Europe had been inspired by Helsinki monitors ‘who risked their lives and
liberty to advance the cause of freedom for others’.64
American objectives for Copenhagen included the adoption of proposals on free
elections, the rule of law, and political pluralism. A number of Paris proposals were
reintroduced at Copenhagen, where there was a high degree of consensus. The United
States, joined by other allies, again introduced a proposal on elections – that they be
held regularly, allow universal suffrage, and offer guarantees that participation be open
to different political parties, individuals, and organisations, which was not fully
implemented in the concluding document.65 One of the most broad-reaching and
widely supported proposals, however, advocated the significance of the rule of law and
such rights as freedomof expression, freedom to assemble and demonstrate, freedomof
association, including membership in a trade union, freedom of thought, freedom of
movement, freedom of private property and was included in large part in the
concluding document. The proposal was intended to alter the fundamental
foundations of state and society in Eastern Europe.66 That such proposals could gain
support from Eastern and Western states at the Copenhagen meeting evidenced the
dramatic shifts that had taken place in Europe. Systemic changes in CSCE states were
reflected in the rearrangement of states supporting and opposing many proposals first
submitted at Paris. For example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) announced
it was now co-sponsoring eight Western proposals on freedom of expression, freedom
of association, and the role of NGOs.67 Commenting on the new configurations, United
States ambassador to the CopenhagenmeetingMax Kampelman, who had struggled to
elicit cooperation from the East at the 1980–83 Madrid CSCE review meeting, wrote:
‘The Soviets have been extremely cooperative with me and ready to accept most
anything within reason. The newly initiated democracies began to feel their oats.’68
The Copenhagen meeting moved the Helsinki process beyond emphasising human
contacts and human rights in that the concluding document declared an explicit
connection between Europe, the CSCE, and pluralistic democracy. For many, the
Copenhagen concluding document reaffirmed their belief in the power of the CSCE to
influence the course of the ColdWar. Between the Bonn and Copenhagen agreements,
the CSCE had facilitated commitments to pursue democratic systems based on the
64 Press Release, 11 June 1990, C.S.C.E. Ministerial 10/1/90, Chronological File, 1989–93, Speech File
Backup Files, Speechwriting, White House Office of, George Bush Library. Under pressure from the
Commission, Baker attended the opening of the Copenhagen meeting. Commission on Security and
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65 CSCE/CHDC.2, 5 June 1990, OSCE Archives; and Statement, Steny Hoyer (United States), 15 June
1990, in Commission on Security and Cooperation Hearing, ‘Copenhagen CSCE Meeting on the Human
Dimension’, 18 July 1990, 101st Congress/Second Session.
66 CSCE/CHDC.16, 8 June 1990, OSCE Archives.
67 CSCE/CHDC.Inf.4, 14 June 1990, OSCE Archives. See also CSCE/CHDC/Inf.2, 11 June 1990, OSCE
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rule of law and a market economy. At Copenhagen, the delegates committed
themselves to free elections, representative government, the rule of law, and a range of
fundamental freedoms not previously adhered to under communist regimes. The
Copenhagen agreement included protections against torture and promoted
democratic values.69 The significance of the Copenhagen CHD went beyond the
dramatic scope of the terms agreed to at Copenhagen to the likelihood that these
provisions would actually be implemented throughout the CSCE, still a new
phenomenon in the Helsinki process.
Kampelman wrote to the State Department that the United States delegation in
Copenhagen had fulfilled Bush’s mandate, announced at the University of South
Carolina, to achieve a document on ‘general elections, political pluralism and the rule
of law, the key building blocks of accomplishing freedom.’70 Shortly thereafter the
president issued a statement commending the agreement in Copenhagen as fulfilling
the goals he had articulated and ‘laying precisely that foundation for freedom’.71 ‘The
promise of the 1975 Helsinki Accords now has become a program of democratic
action’, a White House statement declared, heralding the Copenhagen document.72
Traditional CSCE issues such as divided families and political prisoners were largely
resolved by the end of the Copenhagen meeting. The fall of communism in Eastern
Europe, however, produced new challenges for the CSCE to confront.73
Copenhagen prompted greater US engagement with the Helsinki process, but
American scepticism nonetheless remained about the utility of the CSCE and
particularly its potential institutionalisation. Baker, on background, said, ‘I think
the Europeans have always been favorably disposed toward a greater role for CSCE
than has the United States. After all, we have talked at length about the importance
of NATO to a continuing US role in Europe and it remains very important.’74
When the Bush administration repeatedly talked about developing a ‘new
architecture’ for Europe, the role it intended for the CSCE was largely unclear.
Notably, the Bush administration opposed utilising the CSCE as a forum to discuss
German reunification.75
Given that the CSCE was not established or structured to thrive in a time of such
transition, various adjustments to what was now acknowledged to be a productive
69 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe’, Human
Rights Law Journal 11 (1990): 217 231.
70 AmEmbassy Copenhagen to SecState, 27 June 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers.
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European framework were considered. The Soviet Union proposed elevating the CSCE
to replace the existing East and West military alliances and dismantling NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.76 According to Gorbachev, both he and West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl wanted to use the CSCE to overcome the divisions in Europe and
establish a European security system built around the CSCE framework. The United
States, much as it had done in early discussions about a European Security Conference
in the 1960s, did not support the idea of replacing NATO with the CSCE, an
institution based on a consensual decision-making process, which the United States
believed was ill-suited for such a role.77 The United States’s view was no doubt also
driven by the belief that elevating the CSCE would lead to the departure of American
forces from Europe, invariably reducing United States influence there.78
The future of the CSCE was therefore under regular discussion, including at the
1990 Washington summit. With the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe, the
Soviet Union was without its buffer of satellite states, long thought essential to
preserving Soviet security. Gorbachev therefore struggled with how to confront
potential German unification and the changing security circumstances in Europe.
At the Washington summit, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to fortify the CSCE, as one
step to assuaging Soviet concerns about German reunification.79 With the GDR as a
member of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union had always retained some level of
control over potential German aggression, and Gorbachev saw the CSCE as a possible
mechanism to keep a newly reunified Germany in check as it was an institution
devoted in part to European security to which the USSR and Germany would both be
parties. As a result of its own commitment, the United States was able to convince the
Soviets to accept existing CSCE formulations on peaceful change of borders and
freedom to choose a military alliance to govern a unified Germany.80
Although not raised as prominently or as often as in the Reagan years, the Bush
administration continued to press for Soviet compliance with the human contacts
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Bush’s briefing materials for his Washington
summit meeting with Gorbachev urged him to pressure the Soviet leader on human
rights, suggesting that institutionalisation would facilitate ‘the foundation of a genuine
partnership between us’.81 Bush pushed Gorbachev in particular on remaining
76 Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1997), 227. The Warsaw Pact formally dissolved on 1 July 1991.
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1983–1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 417, 427, 429; Telegram, 19 May 1990,
www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/000053DC.pdf (accessed 10 May 2006); Chronology, ‘CSCE
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refusenik and divided family cases and told Gorbachev that an emigration law needed
to precede any Soviet-American trade agreement.82 Beyond the issue of replacing
NATO, the United States was reluctant even to institutionalise the CSCE. Proponents
asserted that it would allow the CSCE to address situations like the crisis in Yugoslavia
better and, more broadly, would ensure the CSCE would have real authority in
Europe.83 Kampelman, however, expressed concerns about such significant changes to
the CSCE:
I believe that one of the strengths of the Helsinki process was the fact that it was not
institutionalized. It does not have a staff; there is no building, there is a kind of
informality about it that is not bureaucratized. I now hear discussions suggesting
that should be changed. I look at institutions like UNESCO, and the idea of
institutionalizing the Helsinki process becomes frightening. I doubt it can fulfill its
goals in that format.84
For years, CSCE diplomats had avoided saddling the CSCE with a heavy bureaucracy,
but changing circumstances in Europe and a new potential role for the CSCE led some
to think institutionalisation might be effective in ensuring adherence to Helsinki
ideals. John Maresca, a United States diplomat involved with the CSCE since its
inception, said: ‘The Helsinki process is based on a loose amalgam of meetings.
To grow and take on real importance, it needs to be more concrete and relevant to the
everyday problems of Europeans.’85
With the institutionalisation of the CSCE as a principal topic, the CSCE foreign
ministers met in New York in October 1990 to prepare for a CSCE summit in Paris the
following month.86 Bush addressed the delegates gathered for the ministerial meeting
in New York, touting the role of the CSCE in the transformation of Europe: ‘Together
we have brought about the end of Europe’s division and set our eyes on a new Europe,
whole and free . . . There – in the human rights and fundamental freedoms set down
in Helsinki 15 years ago – we find the cause and catalyst of what I call the Revolution
of ’89.’ He also emphasised the CSCE’s remaining centrality to Europe: ‘Today – with
that new Europe within reach – the CSCE remains central to all that Europe can
become.’87 Baker similarly praised the CSCE as the ‘conscience of the continent’. At the
same time, he was clear the United States would maintain its commitment to NATO.88
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The United States favoured NATO as its primary connection to Europe because, as
Baker reports in his memoirs, he found the CSCE ‘an extremely unwieldy and
frustrating organisation’. Thus, it is understandable that he and Bush did not want to
abandon the strong NATO alliance for the CSCE, which was untested and structurally
weak, as the institution through which the United States pursued its interests in
Europe.89 Nonetheless, Baker’s and Bush’s support for a stronger CSCE foretold their
eventual acceptance of a small institutional bureaucracy for the CSCE.
Paris summit
Given the fundamental transformation of Eastern Europe by 1990, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze pushed to move forward the CSCE summit, scheduled for 1992.
Gorbachev writes that his idea was met with ‘suspicion’ at first, but eventually an
interim summit was scheduled for Paris in November 1990.90 At the summit
opening, French President Francois Mitterrand noted the unique nature of the
changes in Eastern Europe: ‘It is the first time in history that we witness a change in
depth of the European landscape which is not the outcome of a war or a bloody
revolution.’ He went on to say: ‘For forty years we have had stability without freedom
in Europe. Henceforth we want freedomwith stability.’91 Bush wrote in his diary that
the American speech at the CSCE Paris Summit was the ‘shortest’ with the exception
of the head of the European Community, Jacques Delors. He wrote: ‘We were
supposed to speak for fifteen minutes, total. I was eight minutes. Said as much as the
others and set an example.’ It is possible to read some scepticism about the CSCE
into Bush’s pride at the brevity of his remarks, although Bush also cited a truism he
learned in his days at the United Nations that ‘the smaller the country, the longer the
speeches.’ 92 At Paris, which many CSCE observers regarded as marking the end of
the Cold War, the sweeping shifts in the East-West relationship were formalised and,
as Gorbachev noted, ‘heralded a new, post-confrontational era in European
history’.93 Representatives from all CSCE states signed two documents: the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security
89 Ibid., 173.
90Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 515, 548; Bush and Scowcroft, AWorld
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Building Measures, which expanded and strengthened the CSBM terms agreed to at
the Stockholm Conference in 1986.94 The charter declared: ‘The era of confrontation
and division of Europe has ended’, and further emphasised the CSCE commitments
to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and market economics.95 It also
established structures and institutions to develop the Helsinki process further,
such as the formation of a Council of Ministers, Committee of Senior Officials,
Secretariat, Parliamentary Assembly, Office for Free Elections, and Conflict
Prevention Centre, but it did not establish a military alliance.96 The CSCE
institutions represented an acknowledgement that although East-West conflict had
dissipated, serious problems remained in Europe. Institutionalisation of the CSCE,
which broadened its activities, was one of a number of steps taken to heal the former
East-West divide in Europe.97
Also at Paris, the NATO and Warsaw Pact states signed the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe, which limited conventional forces in Europe and was
described by a Bush administration official as ‘probably the most ambitious arms
control treaty ever concluded.’98 The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, which
declared an end to East-West conflict between the two alliances, was also signed.99
After the important agreements on democracy and market economics signed at
Copenhagen and Bonn, declaring an end to East-West military animosity suggested
that the Cold War, if not completely over, was ending.
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Accelerating change in Moscow and the CSCE
Despite widespread change, Bush remained conservative in his approach to the CSCE
and the Soviet Union, suggesting it was not only the CSCE’s ‘unwieldy’ nature that
motivated his administration’s continued commitment to NATO. Flying back from his
1991 visit to the Soviet Union, Bush wrote to Gorbachev: ‘Perhaps some Ukrainians
were disappointed, because they wanted to hear a clarion call for “independence now.”
My speech, instead, called for the Republics working matters out with the Center,
stating that it is not for us to dictate regarding the internal affairs of the Soviet
Union.’100 Bush’s speech was derisively termed ‘Chicken Kiev’ by conservative
columnist William Safire who characterised Bush as ‘lectur[ing] Ukrainians against
self-determination, foolishly placing Washington on the side of Moscow centralism
and against the tide of history.’101 Bush’s cautious message was swiftly overtaken by
events and specifically the conservative backlash he had feared.
Responding to Gorbachev’s political and economic liberalisation as well as his
approach to nationalist movements in some union republics, conservative forces in the
USSR acted, initiating a coup while he was on holiday in the Crimea. Bush responded
by garnering support for Gorbachev in the West and speaking with Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin to promise his political backing.
‘We are making very clear to the coup plotters that there will not be normal relations
with the United States as long as this illegal coup remains in effect’, said Bush in a
public statement.102 In the face of international uproar, domestic protests against the
coup plotters, and the unwillingness of the military to act against the demonstrators,
the coup collapsed and Gorbachev returned to Moscow to resume power, however
briefly. In the aftermath of the August coup, Yeltsin told Bush he appreciated the
‘tremendous moral support from you the last several days.’103 Other Western states
also rallied to bolster Gorbachev publicly.104
The long-awaited Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension opened in
September 1991, three weeks after the failed coup, which overshadowed much of the
meeting. In his opening speech, Gorbachev characterised the defeat of the coup
as a triumph for human rights.105 Baker echoed Gorbachev in his opening statement:
‘[The] CSCE has no divisions of tanks. It has instead the moral authority that flows
from [the Paris Charter] principles. But as we saw on the streets of this city three
100 Bush, All the Best, George Bush, 530.
101William Safire, ‘After the Fall’, 29 August 1991 New York Times.
102 Parmet, George Bush, 495–6.
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weeks ago, at critical moments people armed with principles have overwhelmed
tanks.’106 Most of the issues originally slated for discussion at the Moscow CHD, such
as release of political prisoners and freedom to leave one’s country, had been
addressed in the earlier CHD meetings in Paris and Copenhagen and implemented in
the intervening months. Instead, the Moscow conference closely examined the
outbreak of nationalist tensions.107 One of the most significant concerns about a
human rights meeting in Moscow had been access for NGOs, which had become
increasingly part of the fabric of the CSCE to the conference and delegations. As it
turned out, openness was not a problem once the meeting began, and there was a
myriad of Soviet NGOs active in connection with the meeting.108
The Moscow document, like the text agreed to at Copenhagen, demonstrated how
far acceptance of human rights had progressed in the previous years. The CSCE
states noted continuing progress on Helsinki compliance but rising ethnic, national,
and religious discrimination and violence. They expressed concern about human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as capital punishment, migrant
workers, the protection of journalists and artistic freedom.109 United States delegate
Thomas Buergenthal wrote: ‘I would not have thought that Moscow could advance
much beyond Copenhagen, but it clearly did.’110 Despite Buergenthal’s claims, the
commitments made in the Moscow document were not at the same level of
significance as those agreed to at Copenhagen. The Moscow document expanded the
human dimension mechanism, outlined an independent judiciary, addressed
situations of public emergency such as a coup, and contained commitments on
freedom of domestic travel, protections for journalists, preservation of cultural
heritage and safeguards for migrant workers. It did not, however, fundamentally
alter the nature of Europe as the Copenhagen document, with its robust
commitment to pluralistic democracy, had done. At Moscow, new, important
commitments were made, but none that rose to the level of the political content of
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the Copenhagen agreement. By the close of the Moscow CHD, it was increasingly
clear that the CSCE was no longer dominated by blocs or superpowers. Former
communist states were using the forum to turn westward, assert their place in
Europe, and forge the types of East-West connections that Western European
proponents of the CSCE had initially hoped it would facilitate. In many ways, the
Bush administration had missed its opportunity to use the CSCE for its purposes or
to assert its leadership of the evolving body.
Conclusion
As if making their way through a checklist, Bush administration officials repeatedly
raised exit visas, divided families, and other traditional CSCE issues in their meetings
with Soviet leaders.111 They were not, however, activists in this respect. Even when the
personnel remained the same, such as with Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter who was held over from the Reagan
administration, the pace of the representations seemed slower. For example, Schifter
wrote to Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber to highlight his continuing
involvement in Soviet human rights issues and pointed out that he had travelled to
Moscow twice in 1991. In the first half of 1988, however, he had estimated that
American and Soviet officials were meeting every six weeks to discuss human rights
issues.112 As mentioned earlier, this divergence owes something to the White House’s
level of commitment to human rights. More predominant, however, was the outlook
of the president and his vision for the CSCE.
Given the state of availability of records at the Bush Library, some of these
conclusions may warrant further revision.113 The source base of this paper, however,
leads to the conclusion that the Bush administration’s distance from CSCE
mechanisms and traditional issues are rooted in two factors: Bush’s conservative
preference for stability over transformation and low prioritisation of human rights.
Bush and his advisors careened from one formulation to the next, never setting on a
lasting approach to this rapidly changing world. Importantly, none outlined
administration policy toward the Helsinki process or on human rights. My research
suggests that Bush did not seek to transform Europe or the Cold War order. Rather,
111 For example, Baker repeatedly reported that he had raised issues such as emigration in his bilateral
conversations with Shevardnadze. Press Release, 7 March 1989, Folder 10, Box 157, James A. Baker III
Papers; Press Release, 12 May 1989, Folder 17, Box 158, ibid; and Press Release, 26 September 1989, Folder
32, Box 159, ibid.
112 Schifter to Laber, 18 October 1991, New York – United States – Foreign Policy – USSR –
Correspondence (1991–1992), Box 21, Country Files, Chris Pancio Files, Record Group 7, Human Rights
Watch Records, Center for Human Rights Documentation and Research, Rare Book and Manuscript
Library, Columbia University Library; and Anatoly Adamishin and Richard Schifter, Human Rights,
Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009),
144, 149.
113 Considerable progress has been made in releasing Bush administration records since Executive Order
13489 eased access to presidential papers, but much work remains.
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concern for stability and appeals for caution dominated his foreign policy record in
Europe. When change did come, he administered the transition but did not lead it.
Scowcroft has said, ‘President Bush recognised historic change was taking place. He
didn’t create the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really
cataclysmic changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.’114
Mitterrand reportedly disparaged Bush to Gorbachev saying that Bush ‘lacks
original thinking altogether.’115 It may be more appropriate to say that Bush
lacked imagination.116 In his view, containment and the Atlantic alliance structure had
worked. Therefore, as Mary Sarotte has outlined, the administration adopted the
‘prefab model’ of ‘taking the West’s prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order
and international economic and military cooperation, and simply extending them
eastward.’117 The Bush administration did not take the United States in new directions
when the ColdWar ended as the reasons for American success offered an outline for its
future. Bush hoped to preside over the transatlantic order the United States had
aspired to throughout the Cold War rather than conceive of or implement a new
approach to a new world order.
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